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The Politics of Industry in Nehru’s India*
Nasir Tyabji
From the mid-1960s onwards, up to the late 1980s, criticism
had increasingly been voiced of state attempts in India to direct
and regulate processes of economic development.1 After the
initiation of structural reforms in 1991, emphasis on the negative
features of the policies followed during the years from 1947 to
1991 has virtually precluded serious analysis of any enduring
gains from those policies. This is largely because current analysis
abstracts from the distinctive problems that attempting post-war
economic growth posed for countries situated in the Third World,
such as India. Thus, the criticism has ignored any consideration
of the crucial role of state-sponsored structural change, which
accompanies economic growth (and industrial development, in
particular) in predominantly agrarian societies.
Although the Indian economy was predominantly agrarian, it
had specific features which made it possibly unique in the post-
war world. With the development of the Indian cotton textile
industry from the mid-19th century, and the involvement of
Indians in large scale trading activities associated with the
imperial industrialized economies, a (large scale) merchant and
broker/intermediary community had crystallized.2 The two world
wars had allowed capital “accumulation” in other ways, including
blackmarketing and swindling in government contracts.
*An earlier version of this paper formed the basis for a presentation at NMML
as a part of the Workshop on “Nehru’s India” on 1 May 2014.
1 Streeten and Lipton (eds) (1968); Bhagwati and Desai (1970).
2 The formation of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and
Industry in 1927 was the organized expression of this consolidation.
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During the Second World War, in particular, existing
accumulations of money capital were further swollen by
speculative activities, while entry into new industrial ventures
which could have been facilitated by war time import restrictions
which relieved the pressure from international competition were,
as the response to the Roger and Grady Missions shows, actively
discouraged.3 With the repatriation of British interests in jute,
engineering, and the plantations at the time of independence, and
with a secure home market assured, the swindler and
blackmarketeer “accumulations” were invested in the associated
enterprises, particularly in Eastern India. Some of these
accumulations were spent on acquiring managing agencies, while
others were expended in buying large blocks of company equity.4
A large number of very reputable firms thus came within the
control of individuals or groups who had a tenuous connection
with the industrial economy. The point to be emphasized here is
that while the merchants and broker/intermediaries had an
appreciation of the imperatives of an industrialization process,
the other social groups had none.5 They were overnight
3 The Roger Mission, led by Alexander Roger was sent by the British Ministry
of Supply in 1940 to survey the development of Indian industry. While it
attended the meeting of the Eastern Group Supply Council held in New Delhi
in October 1940 and provided impetus to the formation of the Council, it
could do little to ensure that Indian Industry had any substantial role in
supplying defence requirements. Stevens (1941): 10, 15; Mitchell (1942): 18,
fn 9; Birla (1944): 124. The Grady Mission was a technical survey team sent
by the United States Government in early 1942 to assess the potential for
developing Indian industry for war purposes. The Government of India’s
lukewarm response is described in Grazdanjev (1943) and Birla (1944).
4
 Goswami (1985): 245, Tables 4 and 5, show that the large-scale entry of
Marwari controlled capital through the takeover of European companies took
place between 1942 and 1945. Although he does not mention this, the initial
impetus for the European exit probably came from the fears raised by the
Japanese military advances into South East Asia.
5
 The attitudes towards workers and the trade union movement, even amongst
the long established Mumbai textile industrialists, is discussed in Chapter 4
“The Unexplored Sources of Competitive Advantage: Contests on the Indian
Shopfloor” and Chapter 5 “Managing Production and Managing the
Shopfloor” of  Tyabji (2000).
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transformed from members of slightly risqué social groups, into
“captains of industry”.
The years between 1947 and 1966, covering the period from
independence to the end of the third Five Year Plan, provided
the arena for the most acute debates over the content of industrial
development. In essence, these controversies centred on the form
of ownership and control of the industrial undertakings which
were already in operation and those which were to be established.
Primarily at issue, thus, were the roles of the public sector and
of the private sector on the one hand, and of Indian and Foreign
capital within the private sector, on the other. This paper is based,
however, on the proposition that industrialization in India
involved not only the establishment of new enterprises by
individual businessmen, or even by the government. It required
measures of social engineering by the State. It was not simply a
question of the State entering the industrial field in areas of high
risk or those involving long gestation periods and/or large
volumes of capital, leaving other fields to private enterprise. State
activity, whether in the area of industry proper, or in
complimentary spheres, was essential to nurture the development
of entrepreneurs with a truly “industrial” frame of mind.
The thrust of the argument presented in this paper is that it is
this major challenge, of achieving a large task of social
engineering, which faced the political executives of the Indian
state when planned industrialization became the proclaimed
objective. And it is this challenge, both economic and social, that
should form the context of a historical evaluation of State
initiatives. It was not recognized in the early examinations of the
planning process, such as those by the National Planning
Committee, nor by contemporary or subsequent academic
commentators. In other words, this factor has been largely, if not
entirely, overlooked in the discussion on Indian industrialization.
Levkovsky’s work noted that in the colonial Indian context,
there were marked differences to the processes underlying the
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Western European experience.6 In India under colonial rule, the
process of the emergence of the more complex forms of industrial
organization, through the increasing division of labour
demonstrated by the transition from independent artisanal
production, to (manually operated) manufactories and finally to
(power driven) factories, did not take place.7 Factories emerged
directly in the 19th century in a form of organization imported
from Britain. However, while these institutions in Britain
embodied concentration of industrial capital, in India, the factory
form merely cloaked concentrations of merchant and usurer
capital.8 For a relatively long period, Levkovsky states, factory
owners continued to engage in moneylending and trade alongside
manufacturing operations. The process of an ever increasing
concentration on manufacture, and in organized forms of trade
and banking (as opposed to moneylending) was long drawn out.
In fact, until the world economic crisis of 1929 to 1933, capital
engaged in traditional trade and moneylending increased in
absolute terms, though declining as a proportion of total non-
agricultural economic activity.9 Thus, while mercantile and
usurious accumulations of money capital certainly formed the
basis for the initiation of industrial enterprises, the influx of
merchant and usury capital from associated enterprises continued
alongside ongoing processes of industrial capital accumulation.
Thus, even the growth of the assets in a manufacturing enterprise
could not be taken to be entirely the result of industrial capital
accumulation.10 The critical point here is that if the moment in
the process of development of industrial capitalism is to be
assessed, the volume of capital invested in industrial enterprises
can be only a proxy, though it is an important empirical measure.
This paper’s analysis is based on the political economy
premise that industrial capital, merchant capital, and usury capital
are distinct forms of capital with identifiably different methods
6
 Levkovsky (1966): 44. See, also, Lamb (1955).
7
 Levkovsky (1966): 229.
8
 Levkovsky (1966): 229–30.
9
 Levkovsky (1966): 231.
10
 Levkovsky (1966): 243–44.
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of accumulation associated with each. While merchant capital
expands through profits made in the buying and selling of
commodities, usury capital grows through the interest on the loans
advanced by the moneylender. Industrial capital is unique in that
interspersed between the two merchant transactions, of the
operations of buying raw materials and labour power and the
selling of the manufactured commodities, is the critical stage of
production. An index of the degree of industrial development is
then provided by the relative importance of these three methods
of accumulation within a given economy during a specific
historical period. In situations such as those that Dobb had
examined in Western Europe, with industrialization the
importance of industrial capital increased secularly while that of
merchant capital declined relatively.11 Usury was also gradually
reduced in importance with the decline in the role of peasant-
based agriculture with its related phenomenon of low and
precarious incomes. Capital engaged in commercial credit
facilities geared both to production and consumption did, of
course, become increasingly important, but this was decidedly
an activity distinct to usury.
There have been substantial contributions to the understanding
of India’s industrial growth during the pre-independence period.
Starting with Gadgil, Buchanan, Vera Anstey, and Wadia and
Merchant in the pre-independence period, there were major
additions to the scholarly literature from the 1970s onwards which
all addressed, explicitly or otherwise, the question of the impact
of colonialism on the historical record of industrialization.12 The
most distinctive feature that differentiated the approaches,
otherwise quite varied, was one of the two underlying views:
either that arrested development was an empirically demonstrable
phenomenon with colonialism as its principal cause; or that
colonialism, while a historical reality, played no empirically
significant role in the development of Indian industry.
11
 Dobb (1963).
12
 Gadgil (1971); Buchanan (1934); Anstey (1942); Wadia and Merchant
(1957); Bagchi (1972); Ray  (1979); Markovits (1985); Morris (1982); Roy
(1999); Mukherjee (2002).
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Common to all these analyses, however much they differ in
their approaches is, quite naturally, a focus on industry (in
Buchanan’s phrase, on capitalistic enterprise). Perhaps the only
exception was Brimmer ’s analysis of the “setting” of
entrepreneurship in India.13 The institutional setting for
entrepreneurship, in Brimmer’s view, was not the industrial
enterprise itself but the organization that actually held all
operational control over it, the Managing Agency.
In fact, his analysis made clear that the issue was momentous
for a serious study of Indian industrialization. It implied that if
the moment (the precise stage) of development of industrial capital
was to be truly assessed, it was to be clearly noted that the
managing agency firm was the firm in the sense in which this
term was known in institutional economics. If the firm was
defined as the institutional setting in which entrepreneurial
decisions were made, it was immediately clear why the managing
agency should be so designated. To achieve the ends of expanding
their capital, managing agents had generally made use of the joint
stock form of organization for the companies launched to
undertake actual production and trade. These latter companies
were then to be considered as operating units of the central,
decision-making unit, the managing agency firm.14 To understand
the substance of economic activity encompassed by the Managing
Agency system, then, it was critical to avoid a preoccupation with
the Managing Agency merely as a legal entity, as also with the
whole system of company law in India.15
13 Brimmer (1955). What was particularly acute in Brimmer’s observations
was the distinction he made between British and Indian Managing Agencies.
Although he does not analyse the material basis for these differences, it is a
premise of this paper that though the British firms generally displayed a
behaviour associated with cut-throat merchant adventurers, the financial capital
they embodied was qualitatively distinct to the merchant and usurer capital
embodied in Indian Managing Agencies. Misra (1999) has an account of
British expatriates in a colonial setting which well depicts the Lord of the
Flies milieu of Calcutta.
14
 Papendieck (1978) has an interesting analysis of the major Managing Agency
of Andrew Yule and Company, and the operations of their coal enterprises.
This empirical analysis bears out the general point being made in the text.
15
 Brimmer (1955): 559.
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…With a few notable exceptions, the Indian [Managing]
agency firms seem to administer the operating companies
under their control with a view to obtaining the maximum
profit in the shortest possible time…the detractions [to the
reputation of Indian industry] made by Indian [Managing]
agency firms have been made by businessmen still in the
process of maturing [emphasis added].
The implications of this understanding are more profound than
may be immediately apparent. If a manufacturing firm is merely
an operating unit (or even only one unit of many) of a Managing
Agency, which is itself an organizational expression of an
accumulation of merchant or usury capital, then it cannot be held
that the capital that is comprised of the agency and associated
manufacturing units necessarily represents industrial capital as
a whole. The situation is analogous to the historically familiar
case represented by a handicraft establishment subordinated to a
trader. The trader in this case, not the master artisan nominally
in control of production, was the actual entrepreneur. There is
extensive discussion in Indian Economic history of whether
enterprises of these types represented production of an industrial
capitalist form or provided even the “pre-conditions” for industrial
capitalism.16
This paper differs from earlier studies in that while its
argument is firmly located within the view that colonialism did
play the single most important role in retarding the growth of the
Indian economy, its focus is on the development of industrial
capitalism in the sense that political economy views the process,
rather than on “capitalistic enterprise”. It postulates that for this
reason the Managing Agency system, and not the enterprises that
were established and controlled by these agencies, should be the
focus.
The Managing Agency was a closely held firm, whether a
single proprietorship, partnership or limited liability company
16
 Habib (1969); Chicherov (1971); Pavlov (1978).
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through which, under specific agreements, a variety of enterprises
covering the field of industry, trade, and moneylending came
under unified control. “Agency Houses” originated in the late 18th
century as partnerships of employees of the East India Company.17
They provided the means for private business activities, whereby
loans were advanced to indigo manufactories and manufactured
dye received on consignment for sale in Europe. They were also
the means through which surplus funds were invested in
government securities, in shipping and docking services and in
sugar production. The bulk of international trade, including the
shipping of opium to China, and the private trade between Bengal
and Europe was channeled through their hands. In their time the
agency houses held unchallenged control of the commercial life
of Calcutta.18
The agency houses also operated the handful of joint stock
associations founded before 1834. Though the joint stock form
was limited to insurance and laudable societies, the employment
of agency houses as managers provided the organizational model
for the later Managing Agency system.19 Use of the joint stock
form of organization freed the agency from the full risk of the
new enterprise, while its agency agreement permitted it to
maintain control over all management decisions.
In the subsequent 120 years of its unregulated existence, the
Managing Agency survived despite criticism that was regularly
voiced. Various liberal commentators have claimed that although
the Managing Agency system may have outlived its utility, it
played an important role in supporting early efforts in industrial
development: in particular, that industrial enterprises were floated
at a time when there was little possibility of public participation
in share issues, and that the managing agencies nurtured these
firms until their viability and profitability had been demonstrated.
What is not clear is whether the promoters took an exhorbitant
17 Kling (1966): 38; Misra (1999), Chapter 1.
18
 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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commission over an extended period in return for providing this
time bound initial support.20
The relationship between the Managing Agency and the
associated enterprises remained unregulated, in any meaningful
sense, by Company Law during the entire colonial period, and it
was only in the 1950s that this nexus became subject to
legislation. The paper holds the view, further, that it was the
institution of the Managing Agency that enabled the infusions of
money capital, accumulated through varied non-industrial
activities mentioned earlier, into industrial enterprises; it also
allowed the reverse: the transfer of industrial surpluses into trade
and rural moneylending.
The conglomerate nature of large Indian capital including its
operation through the business group, comprising firms in varied
industrial fields and modern banking, but also in trading and
indigenous banking operations, had been widely noticed even
before the first systematic exploration by Asoka Mehta in 1939.21
However, beyond occasional references to the “merchant”
characteristics of industrial capitalists, the implications of such
group structures on industrial performance were not fully
appreciated. Typically, in what is still regarded as the classic
account of industrial organization in the interwar period,
Lokanathan did mention the fact that Indian Managing Agencies
were generally firms which had had a financial, rather than an
industrial, character; he also noted the critical point that rather
than using the banking system, these agency firms often invested
surplus cash in hundis (traditional forms of negotiable instruments
through which prospects of earnings were of an order greater).22
However, neither of these insights underlies his analysis. Vera
20 cf. Papendieck (1978).
21
 Originally published under the title of “India comes of Age”, the article
was republished along with a similar study of the situation in 1949 in Mehta
(1950).
22
 Lokanathan (1935): 301, 303, 315. Managing Agencies and their role in
permitting unfettered business operations under the legal protection of limited
liability are discussed in Tyabji (2009).
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Anstey also remarked on the shortcomings of Managing Agencies,
and mentioned the charge that the surplus funds of firms were
often cornered by shroffs (indigenous bankers) who were also
their managing agents, but as the points were made in the course
of acknowledging a litany of accusations made against them, she
was not compelled to address this issue.23 Much later, Brimmer
characterized the Indian Managing Agencies as “primarily
financial in character”; at about the same time, the situation was
described in more detail, but yet again in a footnote disassociated
from the analysis in the text:24
This [class of business leaders] is a new class of financiers,
who have no traditions, except those of speculative finance
and usury. Some of them earned their fortunes on the stock
exchanges and commodity markets. But their spread of
activities includes sowcari (village money lending), sarafi
(urban indigenous banking and money-lending combined),
dalali (intermediary finance, mostly on the stock exchange,
bullion, and commodity markets), &c…
There is recognized here the distinction between industrial
capital on the one hand, and merchant (trading), or usury
(moneylending) capital even when in ownership, control and
operation of industrial enterprises.
Trading or moneylending activities, empirically distinct from
manufacturing had, of course, been identified. However, the
critical distinctions between these forms of existence of capital,
when in ownership of industrial enterprises have generally been
omitted from analysis. The ownership of a diversity of enterprises
implies not only an obvious diversity of economic interests which
engaged the attention of the owners of the group, but also
underlay the “diversity” of their social identities, at various stages
of evolution from speculators, moneylenders, and traders, to
industrialists. It was not, as has been implicitly assumed, that
business group policies were neatly “industrially oriented” when
23
 Anstey (1942): 114–5; 273–75; 501–5.
24
 Brimmer (1955): 558; Rangnekar (1958): 123–24, fn. 4.
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they concerned industrial firms in the group, and trader or
moneylending oriented in the case of trading or traditional
banking firms.25 There was an integrated management philosophy
that guided strategic decisions covering all the capital resources
at the disposal of the group. Thus:
A typical Marwari family firm, unlike a European jute mill,
was linked to several activities—from aratdari and kutcha
baling in the up-country marts to manufacturing, baling and
fatka in Calcutta-all controlled, like zaibatsus by the family
patriarch and his ruling council and operating by consensus.
Though the firms were nominally under different names and
registered separately, the attempt was to maximise overall
profits covering interdependent complementary and
competitive activities. Thus, a Marwari firm’s profit calculus
was quite different from, and often at variance with, the
norms of … [the Indian Jute Mills Association] … and the
European mills.26
Again, empirically, it was recognized that in the jute industry
some entrepreneurial interests, after accumulating capital through
trading or moneylending, established entirely new jute mills (Birla
and Sarupchand Hukumchand), while others bought controlling
blocks of shares in existing mills and elbowed their way onto the
boards of these companies, and even displaced the incumbent
managing agents.27 These quite distinct ways in which Indian
industry grew were representative of equally clear distinctions
in processes within the political economy. The first embodied the
transformation, however partial and slow, of capital accumulated
in trade and/or through moneylending into industrial capital as
25
 Rajat Ray is one of the few authors to have moved beyond merely noting
the conglomerate nature of Indian business groups to granting that this implied
the simultaneous engagement with manufacture, trade and moneylending. He
too, however, does not consider the accompanying dilution of the industrial
imperative when undertaken in these combinations. See his discussion of the
role of G.D. Birla’s concern for “real entrepreneurship” in the “Introduction”,
to Ray (1992): 58–59.
26
 Goswami (1982): 154.
27
 Goswami (1985): 231–34 describes these two processes.
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the enterprise grew, while the second signified the phenomenon
of the parasitic control of an industrial unit by representatives of
yet incompletely transformed merchant or usury capital.28
There were two further challenges little noticed or commented
on, academically, that faced the political executive. There was
the lure of the quick and high returns available to urban industrial
capital through diverting its resources to the rural money market.
One effect of the colonial constraints on industrial development
was that surplus funds in the hands of capitalists found channels
of high returns through commercial operations in rural land
transactions, and in extending funds to rural moneylending. This
phenomenon was empirically substantiated by the investigations
of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee in the early 1930s.29
Twenty years later, the RBI Survey of Rural Credit confirmed
the continuing existence of links between urban large-scale capital
and the rural money market.30 This flow not only bled the
industrial sector of funds to cover replacement costs of plant and
machinery, but provided a stable base for an economic nexus
between urban industrialists and rural moneylenders. In this
context, the paper points attention to an ignored aspect of the bank
nationalization measures of 1969. This was the effect of state
control over credit disbursement in reducing the flow of urban
money accumulations into the rural money market.
Finally, the Indian situation was unique in that the capitalists
who had emerged during the pre-independence period were drawn
28
 Thus: “In the first place, the surplus funds of a concern are often taken
over by the managing agents as deposits with them, and although the usual
interest may be paid on them, they are utilized in their own agency businesses
or loaned out to allied concerns. Secondly, funds are borrowed in advance
for the purpose of making extensions, and till the time they are actually needed,
they are employed elsewhere in allied concerns or in the managing agent’s
own business”. Lokanathan (1935): 301. Again: “Some managing agencies
had even utilized the funds of mill companies for speculating in shares
& securities, but they may be regarded as exceptional”. Ibid: 303.
29
 India (1931): 99.
30
 Reserve Bank of India (1954): 176–80.
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into the national movement, specifically, into influential positions
within the Indian National Congress. This early support gave them
not only privileged access to senior politicians, but also a moral
authority to project policy measures which they could claim were
not based solely on a narrowly focussed self-interest. The very
close nexus long established between some sections of capital
and the Congress party, made decisive political action
problematical. This nexus is often overlooked when comparisons
are made between the indecisiveness of Indian policies and the
precision with which the Government extracted appropriate
responses from private entrepreneurs in East Asian societies.
The tricky point, as T.T. Krishnamachari, Minister for
Commerce and Industry, was to remind Jawaharlal Nehru, that
while they might privately agree that some industrialists were
unsavoury, they were the only industrialists that the country had.31
Business had to be done with them. However doing business could
not be coterminous with allowing the firms to be managed in any
way the industrialists chose. Interestingly, there is also evidence
that the necessity of administrative coercion in these matters was
understood by the more advanced industrial entrepreneurs.
Sumant Moolgaonkar, of the Tata promoted firm of Tata
Engineering and Locomotive Company (TELCO), currently
known as Tata Motors, pointed out to Krishnamachari that the
Government was the only agency through which the productive
efficiency of the manufacturing sector could be increased.32 As
31
 Letter dated September 2, 1954 from T.T. Krishnamachari to Jawaharlal
Nehru,  T.T. Krishnamachari (subsequently TTK)  papers, subject file 8 (A),
pp. 120–24. T.T. Krishnamachari (1899–1974), initially elected to the Madras
Legislative Assembly as an independent member, later joined the Congress.
In 1946, he became a member of the Constituent Assembly and of the
Constitution Drafting Committee. From 1952 to 1956 he was Minister for
Commerce and Industry and from 1956 to 1958 the Finance Minister. He
became a Minister again in 1962, holding the portfolio for Economic and
Defence Cooperation and then the Finance Ministry, from 1963 to late 1965.
32
 Letter dated October 5, 1953 from Sumant Moolgaonkar to T.T.
Krishnamachari, TTK papers, correspondence with S. Moolgaonkar file, pp.
1–2. Sumant Moolgaonkar (1906–1989) was an engineer trained at the City
and Guilds Institute and Imperial College, London. In the pre-independence
14 Nasir Tyabji
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an industrial manager, Moolgaonkar saw the problem at the level
of the individual firm, while the critical problem, of course, lay
at the level of the social composition of the industrialists.
Theoretically, too, the importance of moving away from the
firm to the social group is emphasized by a consideration of the
role of the State in extending the time horizons of the business
community. This, along with the appropriate technological
educational inputs, helps in the problematical transformation of
a class of merchant-usurers to industrialists.33 In India, the major
instruments for channelling resources into activities necessitating
longer time-horizons were, apart from the fiscal instrumentalities
of the state, in the form of legislation, specifically the Capital
Issues Control Act, the Companies Act, and the Industrial
Development and Regulation Act (IDRA). All these Acts
represented potentially coercive administrative measures aimed
at strengthening the “industrial” characteristics of private resource
allocation decisions. In the event, the Capital Issues Control Act,
playing a subordinate role to the industrial licensing system,
instituted by the IDRA, was of little independent significance.
The IDRA, the key to social control at the level of the firm, did
not ever achieve this goal.34 Initially instituted during the period
when the “Economic Consequences of Sardar Patel” were most
visibly present, it was finally legislated shorn of its more
significant social and political attributes.35 It was thus the
period he worked in the cement industry and helped develop the manufacture
of cement machinery during the Second World War. After the formation of
TELCO in 1945, he was closely associated with its development until his
death. He played an active role as a consultant in planning the development
of the heavy engineering industry.
33
 Policy towards the small-scale sector has been examined in Tyabji (1989).
34 Chibber (2004): 137–42; 152–55; 173–78 provides a detailed account of
the chequered path of the IDRA from the 1949 Bill to its actual passage in
1951.
35 The phrase is from the title of Asoka Mehta’s pamphlet, Mehta (1949). Asoka
Mehta (1911–84) helped organize the socialist wing of the Indian National
Congress, along with Jaya Prakash Narayan, and was closely involved in the
politics and government of the city of Bombay. Mehta was an active participant
in the Quit India movement and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment five
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Companies Act, identifying thereby the focus of social
engineering as the company (a financial unit), rather than the firm
(a productive unit), that provided the most effective legislative
key to social engineering. And it is the Companies Act with which
this paper is mostly engaged.
A project to extend the time-horizon of an entire social group
and that of the dominating social force at that, requires not only
the acquiescence by the more advanced sections of this group of
proto-industrialists in the necessity of such measures. It also
requires the politically adroit combination of measures to ensure
compliance with the accumulation norms of an industrial society.
In February 1958, musing over just how a situation had arisen
by which an outstanding minister, T.T. Krishnamachari, was likely
to be forced to resign over the fallout of the “Mundhra Episode”,
M.O. Mathai had the following explanation to offer.36 In a note
to Jawaharlal Nehru, Mathai argued that the great jubilation
amongst Gujarati businessmen and some Parsi businessmen over
the situation was basically due to the fiscal policies that
Krishnamachari had pursued. Continuing, Mathai explained that
based on various kinds of information available to him, including
messages from “decent” businessmen, it was apparent that the
campaign was the first attack on (Nehruvian) socialism. It was,
indeed, also an indirect attack on Nehru. Opponents of this
ideology were openly proclaiming that socialism would disappear
times. After independence, he helped organize trade unions in Bombay and
was one of the founders of the Indian National Trades Union Congress
(INTUC). Mehta retired from active politics in the early 1950s and wrote
several books on his experiences, on India’s independence movement, and
the importance of socialist oriented reforms. He was a founder member of
Socialist Party and when in September 1952 the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
and the Socialist Party merged to form the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), Asoka
Mehta became new party’s general secretary. He was Praja Socialist Party’s
president during 1959–63.
36
 M.O. Mathai was Special Assistant to Nehru, Secret note 2 February 1958
Jawaharlal Nehru (subsequently JN) Papers File 590 p. 82. For fuller details
of this case, see Tyabji (2010).
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with Krishnamachari’s exit. Further, so the argument went, as the
head of the government Nehru should also resign. A week later,
bowing to the inevitable, Mathai pointed out that if
Krishnamachari had to go, as seemed certain by then, there was
an uncomfortable fact to be faced: that he had been sacrificed
for implementing policies that he had introduced as a loyal
comrade of Nehru’s.37
This paper, based on contemporary records, reaches the
conclusion that while this was, indeed, so there was a more
viscerally felt reason for the opposition to Krishnamachari. This
lay in the “Rama Rao episode”. Though less glamorous, this
drama had led to the resignation of the RBI Governor, B. Rama
Rao in December 1956 over his inability, in his perception, to
prevent the infringement by the Government of the RBI’s
autonomy in determining monetary policy. Actually such a
perception of events trivializes the historical importance of the
episode: it was part of a strategy to institute an effective industrial
policy by subordinating monetary policy to the demands of
industrial development. Further, the paper argues that
Krishnamachari tripped in attempting, through Finance Ministry
stewardship, an ambitious programme of social engineering: he
tried to force a section of the dominant bloc of businessmen, who
had acquired control of industry, to behave like true industrialists,
rather than engaging in moneylending, speculation in stocks and
commodities, or asset stripping. In this, his political fall from
grace provides an object lesson in political economy: the deadly
consequences of misreading the limits to the relative autonomy
of the state.
More successful was the effort to unravel the Dalmia Jain
Group’s mode of operation.38 This paper postulates that the Group
represented one of the largest concentrations of largely
unreformed merchant/usury capital, and that their methods of
using the nexus between their Managing Agencies and associated
37
 Note 11 February 1958, JN papers File 593, pp. 241–43.
38 See Tyabji (2009) for a full account of this case.
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manufacturing firms quintessentialized the behaviour of this form
of capital. Ultimately, the disclosures of the Dalmia Jain
Investigation led to the abolition of the Managing Agency system
in 1969. It should also be noted that despite the dramatic aspects
of the Haridas Mundhra case, his operations were stock market
speculations, unconcerned even with gaining management control
except in the very short term; much more corrosively, Dalmias
specialized in devising means of squeezing all the liquid assets
out of well functioning industrial enterprises which came under
their control.
To recapitulate, the thrust of the argument of this paper is that
the existence of a class of businessmen does not automatically
mean the existence of such a group of industrially oriented
entrepreneurs, because the development of industries is not
necessarily the only money-making activity available to them.
Even acquiring the position of being in charge of industrial
ventures does not automatically convert businessmen into
industrialists because they could very well use their control to
divert resources to other non-industrial activities.39 It therefore
requires a historical process of a definite nature for a class of
true industrialists to come into being. In the Indian case,
colonialism and “arrested development” formed the context within
which emerged the group of businessmen responsible for
managing industrial ventures after independence. They were
an imperfectly formed group of industrialists possessing
characteristics that reflected their background of engagement in
non-industrial activities, activities in which they continued to be
involved even as they acquired control over industrial companies.
In 1949, the Bombay Shareholders’ Association in a memorandum
listed questionable practices by managing agencies owned by
Birla Bros., Dalmia Jain, Karamchand Thapar, Jaipuria, Walchand,
Surajmull Nagarmull, Sarupchand Hukumchand, Kamanis, and
Bajoria amongst the more prominent business groups. This made
them all, it is being argued, prone to a particular kind of fraud
39
 The possibility of such moves (admittedly in the short term) even in a fully
industrialized economy has been suggested by Dillard (1980): 259.
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greatly inimical to the industrialization effort.40 It also meant that
the State had to play a crucial part in transforming this group into
a class of true industrialists. The 1950s and 1960s are naturally
important in this regard being the critical early years of post-
independence industrialization.
40 Bombay Shareholders’ Association (1949): 74–82. Further empirical
evidence for this proposition is available in Bombay Shareholders’ Association
(1936); see, also, India (1958a); India. (1958b); India (1963).
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